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Kind-Dependent Grounding 
ABSTRACT: Are grounding claims fully general in character? If a is F in virtue of being 
G, does it follow that anything that’s G has to be F for that reason? According to the 
thesis of Weak Formality, the answer is ‘yes’. In this paper, however, I argue that 
there is philosophical utility in rejecting this thesis. More exactly, I argue that two 
outstanding problems in contemporary metaphysics can be dealt with if we maintain 
that there can be cases of ‘kind-dependent grounding’, and, moreover, that once we 
allow for the possibility of such cases (in order to solve these problems), we must also 
hold that Weak Formality is false. The paper turns crucially on two main ideas, viz. 
(a) that each object instantiates a fundamental kind, which can determine certain of 
the properties it can have, and (b) that grounding relations can hold conditionally. As 
we will see, it is only in light of these two ideas that we can make sense of the notion 
of kind-dependent grounding that is central to this paper. 
 
Keywords: Metaphysical Grounding; Fundamental Kinds; Coincident Objects; Thinking Parts 
Problem; Metaphysics.  
 
If somebody claims of something named or unnamed that it moves, or runs or 
is white, he is liable to be asked the question by which Aristotle sought to define 
the category of substance: What is it that moves (or runs or is white)? Perhaps one 
who makes the claim that something moves does not need to know the answer 
to this question in order to enter his claim. It is not hard to envisage circum-
stances in which he can know that it moves without knowing what the thing is. 
Yet it seems certain…that, for each thing that satisfies a predicate such as 
‘moves’, ‘runs’ or ‘white’, there must exist some…kind to which the item be-
longs and by reference to which the ‘what is it’ question could be answered.  
                       
                           —   Wiggins, D. (, p. ) 
 
 
 
[C]ertain conditions may produce a background to other conditions having a 
determinative role even though they do not themselves have a determinative 
role. 
             
                           —   Fine (, p.) 
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  Introduction 
 
Suppose that a is F in virtue of being G. Does this mean everything that’s G is F for 
that reason? 
 It would initially seem so. As Rosen () writes: 
 
If Fred is handsome in virtue of his symmetrical features and deep green eyes, then 
anyone with a similar face would have to be handsome for the same reason. Particular 
grounding facts must always be subsumable under general laws, or so it seems.  
(, p. ) 
 
Audi () delivers the same verdict: 
 
Let us suppose that you have a (defeasible) reason to believe that P in virtue of a cer-
tain sensory experience…It is not peculiar to you that when you have this experience, 
it grounds a reason of the relevant sort. Anyone with an experience of the same kind 
will have a reason of precisely the same kind. [Thus] grounding relations do not vary 
from instance to instance of the properties involved in the facts in question. Similarly, 
they do not vary from world to world. (, pp. —)  
 
Following Rosen (), let us refer to the principle gestured towards here as Weak 
Formality.1 This states that if some (possible) object a is F in virtue of being G, then 
if any possible object b is G, b is F in virtue of being G.2  
                                                   
 1 For the stronger principle, Formality, see Rosen (, p. ).  
 2 Cf. Rosen (, p. ): Weak Formality ‘tells us that if some possible thing is green in vir-
tue of having a certain spectral reflectance profile, then as a matter of necessity, anything with that 
profile is green in virtue of possessing it’.  
 3 The more general debate regarding Weak Formality is analogous to the corresponding the 
 
 
 
 
 Weak Formality is certainly intuitive. However, I’ll argue that there’s philo-
sophical utility in rejecting it, by claiming that there’s something to be gained from 
allowing for cases of ‘kind-dependent grounding’, whereby once such cases are  
admitted, we must reject Weak Formality, its intuitiveness notwithstanding.3  
 I first consider a passage from Rosen (), which suggests a way in which 
Weak Formality might fail. I then sketch out the core notion of kind-dependent 
grounding, before arguing that such cases show Weak Formality to be false. My 
strategy thenceforward will then be to display the utility of allowing for cases of 
kind-dependent grounding, by showing how this helps solve two metaphysical 
problems. The central claim is that since the notion of kind-dependent grounding 
does valuable metaphysical work, we should allow that such cases occur and that 
Weak Formality is false. 
  I expect not everyone to agree that the problem cases I present constitute genu-
ine metaphysical problems. (And some will no doubt dispute the assumptions that 
generate them.) I also suspect some philosophers to not like the solutions to the 
problems I offer. (Some may even have solutions of their own they prefer.) Yet, the 
hope is that those who do see genuine problems here, and who see some merit in my 
proposed way of resolving them, will see genuine utility in appealing to kind-
dependent grounding, and thus in rejecting Weak Formality. 
 Roadmap. First I say some more about the notion of grounding itself (§). Then, 
I set out the aforementioned passage from Rosen (), discussion of which will 
                                                                                                                                        
 2 Cf. Rosen (, p. ): Weak Formality ‘tells us that if some possible thing is green in vir-
tue of having a certain spectral reflectance profile, then as a matter of necessity, anything with that 
profile is green in virtue of possessing it’.  
 3 The more general debate regarding Weak Formality is analogous to the corresponding the 
debate between Davidson () and Anscombe () regarding whether causation is general or 
singular. (For a helpful account of this debate see Hitchcock: .) 
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help us work towards the key notion of kind-dependent grounding (§). Along the 
way, we’ll encounter the idea that each object instantiates a fundamental kind, 
which can determine (in some cases) the properties it may have, plus the idea that 
grounding claims can hold conditionally. The following two sections then put the 
notion of kind-dependent grounding to work in connection with two important 
metaphysical problems (§§—). The final section concludes (§). 
 
  Grounding  
 
Many philosophers believe that in addition to causation, we should recognise 
 another determinative relation that’s constitutive in character, and which obtains  
between facts at a time rather than events over time.4 This relation is widely referred 
to as ‘grounding’, claims of which are typically expressed via the ‘in virtue of’ locu-
tion. (I employed this notion in (§) when formulating Weak Formality.) Since 
there’s already a vast literature on this topic, my introductory remarks will be kept 
brief.5 
 To say that some fact  grounds another fact ∆ is to say that ∆ obtains in virtue 
of . That is, it’s to say that the latter fact constitutes the ontological basis for the 
former fact. So if  grounds ∆, then  is the more fundamental of the two, and ∆ is 
                                                   
 4 I assume here, for ease of exposition, that causation relates events—but nothing turns on this 
assumption. As for facts, I am thinking of these as worldly entities—along the lines of Fine () 
and Audi (). However, the views I develop in this paper might be expressed equally well on the 
assumption that facts are true propositions—and hence representational entities rather than ‘bits of 
reality’ (for a theory of grounding that presupposes this latter view see Rosen: ).  
 5 Some key papers here include Audi (), Fine (, a), Rosen () and Schaffer 
(, ).  (But many more could be cited.) 
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the less fundamental (and more derivative).6 Moreover, if  grounds ∆, then there’s 
a non-causal, constitutive sense in which ∆ holds because  does.  
  To use a metaphor from Schaffer (), the relation between grounding and 
causation can be thought of like so: whilst causation drives the world through time, 
grounding drives the world through levels. Causation takes us from an event occur-
ring at one time to an event occurring at a later time. The former event is thus caus-
ally generative of the latter. Whereas grounding takes us from a more fundamental 
fact to another, less fundamental fact. The former fact is then ground-theoretically 
generative of the latter.  
 As this brings out, both causation and grounding are ‘building’ or ‘generative’ 
relations (cf. Bennett: ), and hence relations of determination. Moreover, both 
relations back distinctive types of explanation. If event e causes event e, then e 
occurs because e occurs—in a causal sense of ‘because’. Likewise, if fact  grounds 
distinct fact ∆, then ∆ obtains because of  —in a constitutive sense of ‘because’.7 
 Unlike some authors, I don’t identify grounding with metaphysical explanation. 
(Although the latter relation can, of course, also be expressed with phrases like  
‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’.) In my view, just as we should distinguish the causal 
relation from the causal explanations it backs, so we should distinguish grounding 
from the metaphysical explanations it backs. Accordingly, just as ‘causation’ and 
‘causal explanation’ are distinct, so too ‘grounding’ and ‘metaphysical explanation’ 
are distinct. (For more on this matter see Schaffer: .) 
                                                   
 6 Plausibly, grounding can be one-one, many-one, and perhaps even many-many. But here I am 
interested in one-one cases. (Throughout I follow let ‘ and ‘∆’ stand for arbitrary individual facts.) 
 7 For more on the relation between grounding and causation see Schaffer () and Wilson 
().  
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 I’ve been writing as if grounding is a relation on facts. I’ll continue to assume 
this in what follows. (However, I will also speak loosely of, e.g., ‘x’s Gness ground-
ing x’s Fness’. This should be taken as an informal expression of the claim that: the 
fact that x is F is grounded by the fact that x is G.) Note, however, that this  
assumption is contestable in various ways. Most of what I say here could probably 
be reformulated without the assumption that grounding is a relation between facts 
(were one to disagree with this idea). But I’ll assume the truth of this throughout.  
 I’ll close with some remarks about the logical properties of the grounding rela-
tion. It’s standard to assume that grounding is reflexive, asymmetric, transitive, and 
well-founded. We thus obtain a well-founded partial ordering over the domain of 
facts. Now to me it seems plausible to think of grounding this way. Yet nothing I 
say here turns on that being right. (I note the standard assumptions just to help the 
reader gain a sense of what grounding is supposed to be.) 
 This completes my initial exposition of the grounding relation. (I’ll spare the 
reader a list of examples of grounding. There are enough in the literature.8) Accord-
ingly, we can now turn to the main purpose of this paper. The aim is to discuss the 
following principle: Weak Formality. Let’s write ‘Fa’ to denote the fact that a is F.  
And let’s write ‘Ga < Fa’ for the claim that the fact that a is G (fully) grounds the 
fact that a is F.9 The principle can then be stated precisely as follows: 
 
 Weak Formality: (x) (Gx < Fx) → (y) ((Gy → (Gy < Fy)) 
 
It’s this plausible-looking principle that I’ll be suggesting we ought to reject.   
                                                   
  8 But see esp. Rosen (, pp. —) and Schaffer (, pp. —.)  
 9 Here as throughout, I have in mind the notion of ‘full’ not ‘partial’ ground. (On this distinc-
tion see Fine: a, Schaffer:  and Rosen: .) The ‘<’ notation is due to Fine (a).  
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  Kind-Dependent Grounding 
 
Weak Formality looks prima facie plausible (cf. §). And as we saw, it is accepted 
by Rosen () and Audi (). Yet in more recent work, Rosen () expresses 
scepticism regarding Weak Formality: 
 
Weak Formality is not self-evident. It amounts to the claim that when Ga grounds Fa 
in some particular case, the capacity of the first fact to ground the second derives en-
tirely from the distinctive powers of the predicable G, and not from the combination 
of G and a together. But why shouldn’t there be cases in which G and a conspire to 
make it the case that Fa, in part thanks to G and its distinctive powers, but also in 
thanks to a and its distinctive powers. (, p. , emphasis in the original)10 
 
The suggestion here apparently is that there could be cases wherein there’s some 
difference between items a and b, whereby although both a and b are G, only a is F 
for that reason. Specifically, the thought is that there might be some difference  
between a and b, such that when a is G, a is F in virtue of being G, although when b 
is G, it’s not so that b is F for that reason.  
 This suggestion is intriguing, but also light on detail. For it to be fully fleshed 
out, we must answer this question: what difference could there be between a and b, 
whereby whilst both are G, only one is F for that reason? 
 The rest of this sub-section answers this question. The core idea is that in some 
cases, there’s a difference between the kinds of object a and b most fundamentally are, 
whereby since a is one kind of object, its possession of G makes it so that it is F, 
                                                   
 10 I have edited this passage, replacing instances of the schematic ‘Ф’ with instances of the sche-
matic ‘F’. This is just to bring Rosen’s notation in line with my own. Nothing of substance turns on 
these changes. 
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whereas since b is another kind of object, its possession of G does not make it so 
that it is F. I begin by setting out the broadly Aristotelian idea of a ‘fundamental 
kind’. 
 
. Fundamental Kinds 
 
 
There is a view, broadly Aristotelian in spirit, whereby all objects belong to (only) 
one (most specific) fundamental kind. We can introduce this idea like so. 
 Intuitively, there is a difference between saying what a thing is as opposed to 
merely saying how it is (cf. Fine: b, p. ; Wiggins: , p. ). This intuitive 
thought can be regimented by saying that to specify merely how something is, one 
has to merely list its properties, whereas to specify what something is, one needs to 
specify its fundamental kind (i.e., to state what sort of thing x most fundamentally 
and essentially is). E.g., to say that x is an animal or a person is (arguably) to say 
what x is, it is to specify what kind of object we are dealing with. But the claim that x 
is white merely says how x happens to be. One specifies one of the object’s proper-
ties; but fails to disclose its fundamental kind. (See Wiggins: ,  and Baker: 
,  for a recent defence of this picture.) 
 In this paper, I take this basic framework for granted (the rationale being: it can 
do valuable metaphysical work). I assume also one particular element of the frame-
work, viz., that fundamental kinds can determine, in at least some cases, what prop-
erties their instances can have.11 One way to showcase the plausibility of this idea is 
                                                   
 11 N.b., my view is consistent with claiming that even if being a K is what enables x to have (or 
disables x from having) certain properties F, G, H, x’s being a K might not play this kind of role 
with respect to all of x’s properties. For it might be that e.g. even if x’s being a K is what enables x to 
be F and/or disables x from being G, there are some properties that x has/lacks which x’s being a K 
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via examples. If e.g. x is a proposition, then plausibly, x is essentially and most fun-
damentally so. It is plausible, therefore, to think it’s because x is a proposition that x 
can have certain features and not others. For instance, a proposition may be true or 
false, but neither red nor blue. Plausibly, this is because propositions are not the 
kind of thing that can be coloured, but are the kind of thing that can have truth-
values. We can therefore explain why propositions can have truth-values but not 
colours by appealing to what kind of thing they most fundamentally are.   
 Manifold further examples are possible. A sphere may be misshapen, but not 
ungrammatical. A wedding can be joyous or boring, but not prime of even. A heap 
of sand (plausibly) can’t survive a change in parts, whereas animals and plants seem-
ingly can. All these differences in properties, quite plausibly, are traceable in some 
sense to the fundamental kind the relevant item instantiates. 
 In general, then, the kind of object something most fundamentally is can  
determine the properties it may have. That is the view I am adopting. 12 
 If we allow that fundamental kinds may determine what properties their  
instances may have, then it appears we should grant also that fundamental kinds 
determine which grounding relations their instances are/aren’t able to enter into.13 
                                                                                                                                        
has nothing whatsoever to do with. Indeed, my view is even consistent with some kinds failing to do 
any metaphysical work conditioning which properties a thing can/cannot instantiate—so that what 
properties a thing has turns out to turn not at all on its fundamental kind. (However, what I do need 
is for kinds to play the roles assigned to them in (§) and (§) in order to solve the relevant puzzles.)  
 12 However, it must be understood in the right way. The kind of thing something is determines 
which non-basic properties it may have for some properties and in some cases, i.e. regarding some kinds. 
So I do not say that a thing’s fundamental kind fixes its modal profile entirely, so that x’s being fun-
damentally a K determines the full range of properties x is able to have. E.g. perhaps x could not 
have had another origin than the one it has. This is surely a fact about the properties x can/cannot 
have that does not trace to its fundamental kind. Cf. fn.  above. (As for non-basic/basic properties: 
a property F is non-basic for x iff there isn’t a more basic property G in virtue of which x has F. A 
property F is basic for x iff it is not non-basic for x, so that there is no property x has F in virtue of.) 
 13 But note again that this need not always be so. Perhaps some kinds do not determine what 
properties a thing can have in virtue of what other properties. Cf. fn.  and fn. . I need claim 
only that this sometimes happens—and that it happens in the relevant cases in (§) and (§). 
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If, for example, an object x is of fundamental kind K, and if for that reason, it is 
unable to have the property of being F, then it follows that x cannot be F in virtue 
of being G. Moreover, this will be so even if x is G, and, importantly, even if other 
things, which are not K’s, are F in virtue of being G.14  
 Return now to the case involving a and b. The challenge we faced was to locate 
some relevant difference between these objects that could underwrite the fact that 
only a is F in virtue of being G, although both a and b are G. My suggestion—
given that fundamental kinds can determine what properties their instances may 
have, and thus determine what grounding relations their instances may enter into—
is that the relevant difference between a and b is one of fundamental kind.  
 Suppose that a is most fundamentally a K, whilst b is most fundamentally a K*, 
whereby Ks are able to be F, but K*s are not. Suppose also that both Ks and K*s 
can be G (as witnessed by the fact that both a and b, a K and a K* respectively, are 
G). In this situation, I claim the difference in fundamental kind between the objects 
can underwrite the fact that whilst a and b are both G, only a is F for that reason. 
(Given that a is the kind of thing that can be F, whilst b is not, it is only a that can 
be F in virtue of being G, even though both a and b are G.) Thus, it is the differ-
ence in fundamental kind between a and b that makes it so that Ga grounds Fa, 
even though even whilst b is G, it is false that Gb grounds Fb.   
                                                   
 14 It might be, of course, that in some cases, if a thing is unable to have the grounded property 
because of the kind of thing it is, then for the same reason, it cannot have the grounding property. 
However, we should not assume in advance that all cases are like this. Perhaps in some instances, a 
thing can have the grounding property even though it cannot have the grounded properties that the 
grounding property is able to ground. Moreover, I shall be arguing in this paper (in (§) and (§) 
respectively) that at least two types of problem-case arise when some x is the kind of thing that can 
be G but not the kind of thing that can be F and therefore not the kind of thing that can be F in 
virtue of being G—even though other things (of other fundamental kinds) are F due to being G. 
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 This is the beginning of the account I want ultimately to defend. As things 
stand, however, important details must be filled in. Consider, for example, the role 
that fundamental kinds play in the story. Are they to be conceived as partial 
grounds—so that when a is F in virtue of being G, a is F partly in virtue of being G 
and partly in virtue of being a K? Or is the role of fundamental kinds something 
different? Well, the answer has to be the latter, if the notion of kind-dependent 
grounding is to perform genuinely interesting work. For it is hardly news that one 
thing can be F partly in virtue of being G even if this isn’t so for all the Gs and even 
if some Gs fail to be F entirely. But the really interesting possibility, introduced at 
the outset of this paper, and suggested in the passage from Rosen (), is that one 
thing might be F solely in virtue of being G, even though there are some Gs that are 
not F for that reason. But if we want to make good on this possibility, then we can-
not assign to fundamental kinds the role of partial grounds; but must assign instead 
some alternative role.  
 So: how are we to model the fact that a’s being of kind K somehow determines 
that a is F in virtue of being G, without treating the fact that a is a K as a partial 
ground of the fact that a is F (alongside the fact that a is G)? I suggest we should 
appeal to the claim that grounding relations can hold conditionally (in a sense  
articulated below). The role of fundamental kinds with respect to the relevant 
grounding relations can then be conceived as that of enabling/disabling those 
grounding relations to obtain/from obtaining. (For instance, I will later claim that 
the statue is beautiful but the lump of clay it is coincident with is not. To make 
sense of this, I’ll argue, we should say that whilst the statue is beautiful in virtue of 
having some microphysical property the lump shares, the lump is not beautiful in 
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virtue of having that property, since it, unlike the statue, is not the kind of thing that 
can be beautiful, and so cannot be beautiful in virtue of the microphysical property 
it shares with the statue. Moreover, the idea will be that kinds here play the role of 
conditions, not grounds; a distinction introduced in the next sub-section.15) 
 
. Conditional Grounding 
 
In the literature on causation, a distinction is sometimes drawn between causes and 
conditions.16 That is, it is sometimes claimed that there are cases wherein an event A 
causes a further event B only given that some background condition is met.  
Absent this further condition, so the idea goes, and A would not be able to cause B. 
(That is, whilst A would still obtain, it would not cause B.) As an example, one 
might claim that striking the match caused the fire only given that the background 
condition of oxygen being present was met. On this view, were oxygen to have been 
absent, striking the match would not have caused the fire. So whilst (the event that 
is) the striking of the match would still have occurred, it would have been unable to 
cause the fire, due to the absence of a necessary background condition on this event 
performing its causal work, viz. the presence of oxygen. 
                                                   
 15 The notion of conditional grounding is not my own. However, it has recently been put to 
work in a variety of theoretical contexts. For example, Fine (, ) argues that we need to 
make use of conditional grounding in order to properly model the role that existence facts play with 
respect to the holding of diachronic identities. Moreover, both Ralf Bader (manuscript-a) and Ted 
Sider (independently) argue that we should appeal to conditional grounding (which Sider calls 
‘grounding-qua’) in order to handle the problem of truth-grounding universal generalisations. Lastly, 
Bader () has argued that we need the notion of conditional grounding in order to properly 
model the way in which reasons can vary across contexts (in this connection cf. Dancy: , Ch. 
). In this paper, I will show how we can use the notion of conditional grounding to handle two 
further theoretical problems drawn from contemporary metaphysics, see §§—.  (The notion of 
conditional grounding is also somewhat similar to the notion of an ‘anchor’ in Epstein: , which 
is again something that’s not a ground but that enables other things to do their grounding work.) 
 16 For relevant discussion here see Bader (manuscript-b), Dancy (, Ch. ) and Schaffer 
(). A classic source of scepticism about the distinction is Mill (, p.). 
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 To be clear, the thought here is not that conditions are just partial causes.  
Rather, if C is a condition on A causing B, then, rather than being a further cause 
of B, C is that which enables the causal relation to hold between A and B in the first 
place (due to enabling A to do its causal work in generating B). From this idea, it 
follows that things can play a role in generating events without playing a causal role. 
For, instead of playing a causal role, things can act as background conditions, which 
enable the causal relation to obtain between the effect and the cause due to enabling 
the cause to perform its causal work.17   
 I think a similar distinction can be drawn in the case of grounding.18 What we 
can claim is that, just as, in some cases, (at least on the view set out above), event A 
causes event B only given that background condition C is met, so too, fact  
grounds fact ∆ only given that some condition  is met. In short, the idea is that just 
as background conditions might be relevant to the production of an event without 
themselves being causes of that event, so too background conditions might be rele-
vant to the obtaining of a fact without themselves being grounds of that fact. As 
Fine (, p.) summaries: ‘[C]ertain conditions may produce a background to 
other conditions having a determinative role even though they do not themselves 
have a determinative role’. And as Bader (manuscript-a, p.) writes: ‘[n]ot every-
thing that plays a role in making it the case that something else is the case needs to 
                                                   
 17 As an anonymous referee points out there is the view that ultimately the causes/conditions 
distinction is merely pragmatic and so has no real metaphysical weight (cf. Schaffer: ). Now, 
whilst I do not accept this view myself, I don’t argue against it here. For all I need is that the reader 
recognise the cogency of a view whereby conditions are not causes but play a distinct, sui generis non-
causal role of enabling/disabling causal relations between events to obtain/from obtaining. This can 
then be claimed as analogous to the view about grounds and conditions soon to be introduced later 
in the paper. (For an argument that we should recognise conditions as sui generis enablers/disablers 
on causal relations cf. Bader: manuscript-b) and Dancy: , Ch. .) 
 18 For those who stress the ways in which grounding and causation are alike, such as Schaffer 
() and Wilson (), this idea should seem especially plausible, at least given that causation 
can be conditional in the relevant way (cf. here Fine: , p.). For advocates of conditional 
grounding see Bader (, manuscript-a), Fine (, ) and Sider (manuscript, esp. §..). 
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play a grounding-role’. For ‘things can also be relevant by being conditions that 
must be satisfied for other things to do their grounding work’. 
 To make sense of conditional grounding, we must distinguish the different roles 
things can play in making a fact obtain. Let  conditionally ground ∆, whereby the 
condition on this grounding relation holding is that  obtains. In this case, the 
grounding relation obtains solely between  and ∆. However, it holds between  
these facts only given that the condition, , is met. Moreover,  and  play fun-
damentally different roles in making ∆ obtain: whereas  plays a grounding role,  
plays the role of a condition, i.e., whereas  acts as the ground of ∆,  acts as the 
condition on the grounding relation between  and ∆ obtaining (the condition’s 
role in making ∆ obtain being to enable  to do its grounding work, rather than 
acting as even a partial ground for ∆.) 
 Conditions, then, are not to be treated as partial grounds (just as conditions in 
the causal case are not to be thought of as further causes, at least on the view 
sketched above). Rather, they are to be understood as playing different roles entirely 
to grounds.19 Specifically, they should be thought of as playing a sui generis role in 
helping to make it the case that certain facts obtain, by enabling the grounding rela-
tion to hold between the grounding and the grounded fact.20 Consequently, to un-
                                                   
 19 In the causal case, one might want to allow the cause/condition distinction to stand, but treat 
it in a deflationary way and hold that really, conditions are just partial causes (cf. fn. ). One could 
of course hold an analogous position regarding the ground/cause distinction. In my view Bader 
(, manuscript-a) makes a convincing case (via appealing to absences) that a robust distinction 
between grounds and conditions can be be drawn. However, one should keep in mind that by draw-
ing a genuine and robust (so not merely pragmatic) distinction between conditions and grounds, one 
can do valuable metaphysical work, as will be proven in this paper (see §§—). So let’s assume that 
grounds are sui generis enablers/disablers on grounding relations obtaining. We can then reveal the 
important metaphysical work that this distinction can do. 
 20 Compare Sider on the notion of ‘grounding-qua’ (Sider’s term for conditional ground): 
‘grounding-qua statements [i.e. statements of conditional ground] must be understood as sui generis, 
in that they cannot be defined as meaning that [a certain collection of facts] A…, together with the 
further statement that they satisfy the condition, ground B in the orthodox sense. The further state-
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derstand conditional grounding, we have to draw a robust distinction between 
grounds and conditions, whereby conditions simply enable the relevant grounding 
relations to obtain. (I take this assumption as unproblematic here. But I realise that 
one could contest the grounds/conditions distinction in various ways.)  
 This is of course all rather schematic (but see the example at the end of (§.)). 
However, in (§) and (§), we will see two putative examples of conditional 
grounding at work. In these cases, the condition on the grounding relation holding 
will be that the object be fundamentally a certain kind of thing. 
 
. Kinds as Conditions  
 
With the notion of conditional grounding introduced, return to the case of the two 
objects a and b. Suppose that whilst a is the kind of thing that can be F, the same is 
not true of b. For this reason, (so the idea goes), a is F in virtue of being G, whilst b 
is not, although both items are G. The question we’re now engaged with is: how are 
we to model this, i.e., how should we think about the role of fundamental kinds in 
making it so that a is F in virtue of being G whilst b is not? My suggestion is that 
we model this using the notion of conditional grounding, treating fundamental 
kinds as conditions. On this view, when a is F in virtue of being G, the grounding 
relation holds only given the condition that a is fundamentally a K. The fact that a 
is a K thus acts as an enabling condition on a being F in virtue of being G. That a is 
G is consequently the sole and full ground of the fact that a is F. Whereas that a is a 
K is simply what enables this grounding relation to obtain. As for b, that b is a K* 
                                                                                                                                        
ment [i.e. the condition] is not part of the ground of B; rather it is in light of the further statement 
[condition] that A,…ground B’  (Sider: manuscript, p.).  
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acts as a disabler on b being F in virtue of being G. Given that b is of kind K*, and 
given that unlike Ks, K*s cannot be F, it follows that b cannot be F, and hence can-
not be F in virtue of being G. So, although b is G, b is not F in virtue of being G, 
since b is not the kind of thing that can be F. 
 Let’s say that in general, cases where x is F in virtue of being G, but only on the 
condition that it’s fundamentally a K, are cases of kind-dependent grounding. As we 
will see, once we allow that cases of kind-dependent grounding are possible, we can 
see that Weak Formality has to be rejected. For Weak Formality entails that if two 
things are G, and one of them is F in virtue of being G, then both are F in virtue of 
being G. However, this is not so if cases of kind-dependent grounding are possible. 
For it might be that whilst both things are G, only one of them is the kind of thing 
that can be F, so only one of them is the kind of thing that can be F in virtue of 
being G.21 
 In the following two sections, I explain how two outstanding problems within 
contemporary metaphysics can be handled when viewed as cases of kind-dependent 
grounding. This will provide us with broadly abductive reasons for accepting that 
cases of kind-dependent grounding are possible and that Weak Formality is false. 22   
                                                   
 21 Strictly speaking, Weak Formality is not proven to be false given only the bare possibility of 
cases of kind-dependent grounding. What is also needed is for it to be possibly the case that (i) 
things that are G are F in virtue of being G (so long as they are things of the right kind), and that (ii) 
two things, x and y, are both G, even though only one of them is the kind of thing that can be F (in 
virtue of being G). The following two sections of this paper in effect provide the basis for a broadly 
abductive argument to the effect that cases of this kind are indeed possible.  
 22 Certain variations on the notion of kind-dependent grounding may also be of interest. E.g. in 
place of kind-dependent grounding, one might consider the idea of essence-dependent grounding, or 
form-depending grounding, etc. In general, for any φ such that plausibly, what properties a thing is 
able to have is (at least in part) determined by its φ (its kind, its essence, its form, its mode of com-
position, etc.), one could defend the possibility of φ-dependent grounding. In this paper I focus on 
the idea that grounding can be conditional on kinds, but if one prefers one can develop the idea 
using essence or form (etc.). Much the same work could be done with these variant forms of  
φ-dependent grounding. 
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 Before moving on, one further thing must be said regarding fundamental kinds. 
Earlier, I said that in specifying x’s fundamental kind, one specifies what sort of  
being x essentially and most fundamentally is. That is, one says not merely how x is, 
but rather what x is. What I now want to add is that fundamental kinds are in my 
view not grounded, and indeed are not even apt for grounding.23 In general, for some 
features of an object, one can explain why the object has that feature in more basic 
terms. When it comes to fundamental kinds, however, I think no such explanation 
can be given. When a thing is fundamentally a K, this fact about it is not only not 
grounded, but is not even apt for being grounded. That is, it is ‘autonomous’ in the 
sense of Dasgupta (). As Dasgupta argues, it looks plausible to think that the 
essential truths about an object are amongst the truths about that need not be 
grounded in the way that other truths about it might. Accordingly, since specifying 
the fundamental kind of an object is to specify what sort of thing it essentially is, 
there is no need to say what grounds its fundamental kind. Thus, on this picture, 
fundamental kinds are not even being apt to be grounded and for this reason lack 
grounds.24,25 (One could perhaps also take kinds as fundamental with equal plausi-
bility—my reasons for not doing this are given in fn.  and fn. ). 
                                                   
 23 Strictly speaking, I need the claim that some fundamental kinds are like this, whereby the rele-
vant fundamental kinds are those that figure in generating the problem cases with which this paper 
deals (in (§ and §). But plausibly a claim of this kind ought to be fully general. 
 24 Again, this view of matters is not uncontroversial. The sceptical reader, however, is asked to 
keep in mind that this claim forms part of a larger class of views, which (I argue) collectively generate 
a satisfactory solution to two important and as yet unresolved metaphysical problems. (It should be 
noted also that, as I have said earlier in the paper, most of what I say could also be said within a 
framework wherein fundamental kinds are grounded and so are not basic or ‘autonomous’; but as I 
mention later in the paper this view gives rise to problems see fn.  below and also fn.  in (§).) 
 25 This latter view, in fact, i.e. that kinds are autonomous, forestalls the objection (that in (§) or 
(§) the reader might be tempted to raise, perhaps by asking this question: why not treat (funda-
mental) kinds as partial grounds rather than sui generis conditions, thus doing without the extra ide-
ology (of conditions in addition to partial grounds)? The answer would then be: because fundamental 
kinds, being autonomous, stand outside of the grounding hierarchy altogether, and so are not apt to 
play the role of grounds (but can act as conditions). (Thus if one says that fundamental kinds are in 
need of grounding (i.e. are non-basic), one can no longer forestall this important objection in the 
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 This view of matters is not uncontroversial. Indeed, for some kinds, it may seem 
much more plausible to think that there must be some ground-theoretical explana-
tion as to why the object is the kind of thing it is. This suggests an objection.26  
Consider the kind statue, which one might plausibly take to be a fundamental kind 
in my sense (in saying that x is a statue one thereby says what x is, not merely how it 
is; indeed below, in (§), I at least write as if I agree with this.) Now Fine writes: 
 
Surely…there must be some [ground-theoretic] account of what is involved in being a 
statue or a piece of clay, from which it should then be apparent why a given object is 
the one rather than the other. (, p. ) 
So the worry is: not all fundamental kinds can be autonomous, since at least some 
of them clearly demand ground-theoretic explanation.  
 There are various ways to respond to this objection. But my main reply is this. 
As we will see in the next section, with the assumption being challenged by the  
objector about fundamental kinds in the background, i.e. that fundamental kinds 
are autonomous, we can solve two important metaphysical problems that are pres-
ently unresolved. This, I submit, is one reason—and indeed in my view, it’s the 
main reason—to accept that kinds are non-grunded, intuitions to the contrary 
aside. (In short: abductive reasons override intuitions.27)  
                                                                                                                                        
elegant aforementioned way. The same is true if one says that kinds are fundamental rather than 
autonomous and so are within the grounding hierarchy despite as it happens lacking in grounds.) 
 26 Thanks here to an anonymous referee. 
 27 Cf. Lewis’s () defence of modal realism: the theoretical work that Lewisian possible 
worlds are said to do is meant to override the intuition that of course no such worlds exist. 
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 Now doubtless, there are other ways to reply to this worry. But for reasons of 
space, I will not set out these further replies in any detail. I also think the one I have 
just mentioned is the best of those available. So at this point let us move on.28 
 I shall assume, then, in what follows that fundamental kinds are not in need of 
grounding due to being ‘autonomous’ and thus outside the grounding hierarchy. 
Again, the main reason (I claim) to accept this view is because of the theoretical 
work it can do. (However, one could have a view whereby fundamental kinds are 
non-basic and still solve the puzzles of (§) and (§) in the same way (see fn. ), 
but this view is problematic for reasons given in fn.  and fn. . Likewise, one 
could also have a view on which they are fundamental rather than autonomous, but 
once more I explain why this view is not preferable in fn.  and fn. .) 
 
  Coinciding Objects 
 
Many believe that distinct material objects can coincide, i.e., wholly occupy the 
same region of space and be composed of the same microphysical parts at once. 
Consider e.g. a statue and the lump of clay making it up. The statue seems unable 
to survive being squashed, for plausibly it must have a certain form or structure in 
                                                   
 28 I’ll mention one other reply suggested to me by an anonymous referee would involve adapting 
an idea of Bennett (). The idea would be to say, presumably, that for every possible fundamen-
tal kind, there is an actual object that has it. I could then claim that there is no need to explain why 
any object instantiates the kind it does—just as Bennett does in her paper (albeit with modal proper-
ties in place of kinds). The trouble, however, is that this reply entails a plenitudinous view whereby 
every matter-filled region of space is literally ‘chocka’ with distinct coincident objects (as Bennett 
puts it). But whilst I’m not against not against coincidence as such, I do worry about there being 
masses of co-located objects. This kind of view also leads to various problems, e.g. the many-persons 
problem (Chihara: ) and the personite problem (Johnston: ). (Relatedly, as [anonymous] 
pointed out to me, bringing in these legions of objects reintroduces the mighty host of conscious 
beings I try to avoid having to accept in (§).) Lastly, this view may even undermine the entire  
enterprise of giving real definitions ‘of the things themselves’ (cf. Leslie & Johnston: manuscript), 
which has been so central to much contemporary metaphysics.  
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order to exist, one it would lose if it were squashed. But the lump could survive  
being squashed. Accordingly, the statue and the lump differ in properties, and so by 
Leibniz’s Law are distinct.29 Given this fact, the most plausible thing to say it seems 
is that they are distinct yet coincident objects.  
 Or consider a person and her body. The person wouldn’t survive even a gentle 
death; with death the person ceases to be. The body, however, could well survive a 
gentle death. Accordingly, the person and her body are distinct. Again, given this 
fact, the most plausible view is that the person and her body are distinct, coincident 
items (see Sosa: , pp. — and Johnston: , p. ).30 
 In the next sub-section, I focus on cases involving coincident objects which 
instantiate different fundamental kinds (so I set aside alleged cases of ‘same-kind  
coincidence’).31 Specifically, I focus on coincident objects that differ in (at least 
some of) their non-basic properties. The trouble, as we will see, is that it’s difficult 
to make sense of how coincident objects could differ in such properties. Indeed I’ll  
argue that order to make sense of this, we must allow for cases of kind-dependent 
grounding and reject Weak Formality.  
 The following sub-section deals with an objection. What will emerge is the idea 
that plausibly, the kind of item something is can determine not only which non-
basic properties it can have, and so which non-basic properties it can have in virtue 
of which more basic ones, but also which of its more basic properties can act as 
                                                   
 29 Some philosophers have tried to resist this line of argument by appealing to ‘predicational 
shifts’ (though see Fine:  for some powerful criticisms of this move). Others have tried the con-
siderably more radical option of rejecting Leibniz’s Law, by appealing to some form of relative iden-
tity (for further discussion of these matters see Burke:  and Noonan: ). 
 30 Manifold similar examples could be given here. E.g., it is often said that a person would ‘go 
with the brain’ in a brain-transplant case, whilst the body would stay on the operating table. This 
again would appear to establish the distinctness of these items (cf. Shoemaker: ). 
 31 In fact, I follow Locke () and Wiggins (, ) in holding that there are no such 
cases. (Contrast Fine () and Johnston () for arguments to the contrary.) 
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grounds for its less basic ones. This will bring out a further way in which Weak 
Formality might fail. 
 
. The Problem 
 
Focus on the statue/lump case. These items are fundamentally different kinds of  
object: one is a statue, the other a lump (of clay). Now it’s often said that there’s a 
problem regarding how the statue and the lump could differ in kind, since they are 
composed of the same microphysical parts. However, there is only a problem here if 
we assume that what kind of thing something (fundamentally) is depends on its 
microphysical profile. Yet I deny that assumption. In my view, there is nothing that 
explains why an object is the kind of thing it is (cf. §.). The fact that an object is 
most fundamentally an item of kind K is not explicable in more basic terms. There 
is no ground for the fact that x is fundamentally a K (and not a K*).32 
 Accordingly, in my view, we can accept unproblematically that the statue and 
the lump are (fundamentally) different kinds of thing.33 However, this is not to say 
that coincident items pose no problems at all. Indeed, that such items can and do 
differ in their non-basic properties poses a real problem that demands a solution.  
 Note first that when it comes to material things, it’s plausible to think their 
non-basic properties are (ultimately) grounded in underlying basic microphysical 
                                                   
 32 Notice that one cannot solve the problem of explaining why coincident objects x and y differ 
in kind despite being microphysically alike in the way that I just did unless one treats them as being 
autonomous and hence no even apt for being grounded. This is the second of the two reasons men-
tioned above for not endorsing the view the kinds are ungrounded, the first having been given in fn. 
 in (§) of this paper. (Well, one could also treat them as fundamental rather than autonomous: 
but then one will find it harder to treat kinds as conditions rather than partial grounds, cf. fn. ).  
 33 It might also be that there is some way of explaining why objects differ in kind despite sharing 
their microphysical properties. In that case, we would not need the assumption that kinds are auton-
omous in order to handle the problem just raised. However, there are other reasons for doing so. See 
fn.  and fn. .) 
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properties. If x is a material object and if F is some non-basic property of x, then 
plausibly there is some microphysical property M x has such that x is F in virtue of 
having M. This view is standardly referred to as Microphysicalism.34 
 We now focus on an example. Consider the fact that whilst the statue is beauti-
ful, the lump it is coincident with is not. We thus get: 
 
 () The statue is beautiful. 
 () The lump is not beautiful. 
 
The trouble is that from the plausible premise that being beautiful is a non-basic 
property, plus Microphysicalism, we can derive a contradiction from () and (). At 
least, this is given that Weak Formality holds.  
 
THE ARGUMENT 
 
By Microphysicalism, () implies: 
 
 () There is some microphysical property, M, such that the statue is beautiful  
  in virtue of having M.  
 
                                                   
 34 Compare the thesis of Mereological Supervenience in Kim (). In effect, Microphysicalism 
is the ground-theoretic analogue of Kim’s thesis of Mereological Supervenience. (As I am sure Kim 
would recognise, it is something like Microphysicalism that rationalises Mereological Supervenience 
in the first place—since for Kim, supervenience relations merely suggest the presence of interesting 
dependence relations like grounding but are not themselves such relations (see .g. Kim: : ). 
 
 
 
 
 
(In general, the microphysical properties of an object are a function of the proper-
ties and relations of the object’s microphysical parts. Accordingly, microphysical 
properties can be both intrinsic and extrinsic, at least on my view of matters.) 
 Now since grounding is factive, claim () entails: 
 
 () The statue has microphysical property M. 
 
 But the statue and the lump are coincident, and so composed from the same 
microphysical parts. Hence, the lump has all the same microphysical properties as 
the statue (given Leibniz’s Law). Thus: 
 
 () The lump has microphysical property M. 
 
Yet Weak Formality tells us that if some possible object a is F in virtue of being G, 
then if any possible object b is G, b is F in virtue of being G. So from this thesis, 
plus (), we can derive: 
 
 () If any object whatsoever has microphysical property M, then it is beautiful  
  in virtue of having M.  
 
 However,  () and () entail: 
 
 () The lump is beautiful in virtue of having microphysical property M. 
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And since grounding is factive, claim () entails: 
 
 () The lump is beautiful.  
 
The problem: () and () engender the contradiction that the lump both is and isn’t 
beautiful. Moreover, the problem is quite general. For given Microphysicalism and 
Weak Formality, we end up facing this issue whenever coincident objects differ in 
terms of some non-basic property. 
 One way to react here would be to reject Microphysicalism. Another option 
would be to claim that all differences between coincident objects are ungrounded 
(fundamental) differences. However, these moves seem implausible. Moreover, 
there is a better way. For, we can instead put to work the notion of kind-dependent 
grounding (see §). We can then reject Weak Formality, and block the inference 
from () and () to ().  
 My response depends on the intuitive claim that whilst the statue is the kind of 
thing that can be beautiful, the same is not true of the lump of clay. Now I will just say 
here that this claim feels correct to me. If something is a statue, it is the sort of 
thing that can be beautiful, whereas if something is a lump (of clay), then it is not 
the kind of thing that can be beautiful.35 Let us suppose that we accept this claim.36 
Then if we grant that being beautiful is a non-basic property of the statue, and also 
                                                   
 35 One might argue to the contrary that whenever lumps of clay and statues are coincident, both 
items will be beautiful. But this is not a worry for me, for whilst it would show, were it true, that 
lumps are not the kind of thing that cannot be beautiful, it would also show that beauty, at least 
when it come to statues and lumps, is not one of the properties apt to generate instances of problem 
I am concerned with. (More generally, whenever the constituting item shares the non-basic property 
with the constituted item, then we do not have an instance of the problem I am dealing with.) 
 36 Again, one could also accept a variation on this claim, according to which the statue but not 
the lump is able to beautiful because it has a certain form, or manner of composition,…etc. 
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grant Microphysicalism, we must accept that there’s some microphysical property, 
M, in virtue of which the statue is beautiful. However, if the statue is only able to 
be beautiful given it’s the kind of thing able to have this property, then what we have 
is a case of kind-dependent grounding. That is, we have a case wherein, although () 
is true, it is true only given that the object in question (the statue) is a certain kind 
of thing. It follows that claim () is more perspicuously written as follows: 
 
 (*) There is some microphysical property, M, such that the statue is beautiful  
  in virtue of having M, whereby this grounding relation holds only given  
  that the statue is the kind of thing it is. 
 
On this view, whilst the statue is beautiful in virtue of having M, that the statue has 
M makes it so that it is beautiful only given that it meets the condition of being a 
certain kind of thing. Call the particular statue x. We can then put this point by 
saying: the fact <that x has M> grounds the further fact <that x is beautiful> only 
given that x meets the condition of being the kind of thing that can be beautiful 
(which it does, given that x is a statue). In short, x’s fundamental kind enables the 
grounding relation to obtain between the grounding fact <that x has M> and the 
grounded fact <that x is beautiful>. 
 This view implies that having microphysical property M is not sufficient for  
being beautiful. For in addition, an item must meet the condition of being the sort 
of thing that can instantiate the property of being beautiful. Thus, were something 
not to not be the kind of thing that can be beautiful, then even if it had microphysi-
cal property M it would not be beautiful for that reason. So Weak Formality fails, 
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and the same is true for the more specific (). For, if being beautiful requires being 
a certain kind of thing, then being beautiful in virtue of having microphysical prop-
erty M requires being a certain kind of thing as well. 
 Instead of (), however, what is true is something more like: 
 
 (*) If any object whatsoever has microphysical property M, then if that  
    object is the kind of thing that can be beautiful, it is beautiful in virtue 
    of having M.  
 
This reformulation then suggests a more general re-formulation Weak Formality. 
Again, that principle was stated in the following way earlier in the paper (§): 
 
 Weak Formality: (x) (Gx < Fx) → (y) (Gy → (Gy < Fy)) 
 
I now suggest that we replace this principle with the following: (letting ‘KF’ stand 
for the predicate ‘is the kind of thing that is able to be F’): 
 
 Kind-Dependent Formality: 
  (x) (Gx < Fx) → (y) (Gy & KF y→ (Gy < Fy)) 
 
Let us sum up. Once we recognise that cases of kind-dependent grounding, we can 
resolve in a compelling way a problem that arises for those who claim that there are 
differences in non-basic properties between coincidents. This strategy, however,  
requires rejecting Weak Formality, replacing it with Kind-Dependent Formality. 
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 Thus, there is motivation for rejecting the former principle, and replacing it 
with the latter—at least for those with certain background metaphysical commit-
ments (those that in fact many contemporary philosophers share). 
 Moreover, it seems that this basic strategy can be employed to solve a whole 
range of similar problems. For if we grant Microphysicalism, then we face exactly 
the same problem whenever we wish to allow that coincident objects differ regard-
ing any non-basic property. So since it seems plausible to think that whenever such 
objects differ in their non-basic properties in this way, this is traceable to some 
difference in fundamental kind, we can employ the same basic strategy as above in 
order to avoid contradiction when wishing to claim that the coincident objects gen-
uinely differ in terms of the non-basic property. 37 
 For instance, by appealing to the kind-dependent grounding strategy, we might 
be able to make headway with the longstanding problem regarding modal differ-
ences between material things. For it is plausible to hold that these modal differ-
ences are in some way at least traceable to a difference in fundamental kind.38 We 
might also be able to make headway with the important problem as to how  
persons and their bodies manage to differ in consciousness. For plausibly, this 
                                                   
 37 It is of note that if indeed we can maintain that whenever coincident objects differ in terms of 
some non-basic property, this can always (at least in some sense) be traced back to a difference in 
fundamental kind between them, then we can offer a compelling answer to what Koslicki () 
calls the ‘similarity problem’. (We could even make headway with this problem if we claimed that 
many, if not all, cases of coincidents differing in non-basic properties involves the property-
differences tracing to their kinds.) Essentially, the problem is to explain not only how the coincident 
objects manage to differ in certain ways, but also why in certain respects they are the same. That is, 
we have to explain why some properties (like mass) are shared, whilst others are not shared (like 
beauty). My answer is that the shared properties are either those that are not kind-dependent or 
those that are kind-dependent but that can be had by both statues and lumps. Whereas those that 
are not shared are “kind-dependent properties” that can be had only by statues and not lumps/only 
by lumps and not statues. Given this view, I submit, we can offer a plausible and principled account 
as to why (e.g.) the statue and the lump differ with respect to certain properties but not others. 
 38 Cf. Fine (, p. ) ‘we ask how it is possible for the piece of alloy to survive being 
moulded into the shape of a sphere but not possible for the statue, then the answer which most natu-
rally suggests itself is that it is because the one is a piece of alloy and the other is a statue of Goliath 
that they enjoy the capacities or incapacities for variation in shape that they do.’ 
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difference seems traceable in some sense to the fact that whilst the person is the 
kind of thing that can be conscious, the same is not true of the body. 39 
 
. An Objection 
 
I now want to deal with an objection.40 Consider the following case. We have a 
piece of metal constituting a statue. In this particular case, the piece of metal is not 
valuable, but the statue is. But one might think that it is just not true that things of 
the kind piece of metal are (in virtue of their kind) unable to be valuable. For per-
haps some pieces of metal are valuable whilst some others are not. 
 The more general problem is this. It might be that x and y are coincident and so 
share microphysical properties. Yet they differ in non-basic property F. My way to 
avoid contradiction is to claim that if, say, x lacks F whilst y has it, then x is the 
kind of thing that cannot be F, and so cannot be F in virtue of the base properties it 
shares with y (§.). But perhaps this won’t cover all cases. For perhaps whilst x is 
not F, other things of the same fundamental kind as x are in fact F. 
 Let’s grant for the sake of argument that such cases are possible. My response is 
to invoke a different way in which fundamental kinds can condition what ground-
ing relations objects can enter into. Consider the case of the piece of metal that is 
not valuable—the one that is coincident with a statue that is valuable. By Micro-
physicalism, plus Weak Formality, the piece of metal ought to be valuable when it 
is not. Yet I cannot respond by saying that the piece of metal is not the kind of 
                                                   
 39 Indeed, it just sounds wrong to say that my body is thinking. As David Wiggins writes, in 
connection with the idea that we human persons are identical with our bodies, so that our bodies are 
thinking beings with the same full range of mental capacities as ourselves ‘…there is something  
extremely unnatural—so unnatural that the upshot is simply falsity—in the proposition that peo-
ple’s bodies play chess, talk sense, know arithmetic, or even run or jump or sit down.’ (Wiggins: 
, pp. -, cf. Fine: , p.  and Johnston: , p. .) 
 40 I thank an anonymous referee for raising it. 
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thing that can be valuable and so not the kind of thing that can be valuable in vir-
tue of the microphysical property M that makes the statue valuable, granting that 
some pieces of metal can be valuable. What can be said, however, is that pieces of 
metal are not the kind of thing that can be valuable in virtue of microphysical proper-
ty M. Regarding those pieces of metal that are valuable, they must be valuable in 
virtue of having different base properties than those pieces of metal that are not  
valuable. And so they must be valuable in virtue of having different base properties 
to that base property the piece of metal coincident with the statue (the one that is 
not valuable) shares with that statue, namely, microphysical property M.  
 N.b. this view is not ad hoc. For if kinds can determine what non-basic proper-
ties a thing can have, should they not also be able to determine which base proper-
ties can (conditionally) ground certain of their non-basic properties?  Moreover, this 
view has the virtue of explaining why some instances of a kind can have non-basic 
property F whilst others cannot (if indeed this can be so). The answer is: their kind  
determines that certain base properties can make them F whilst others can’t. 
 We now see another way in which Weak Formality might fail. This thesis 
claims that if x and y both have G, and if x is F in virtue of being G, then both 
must be F in virtue of being G. I showed one way in which this might be false in 
(§.). The second reason I now offer why this thesis might be false is that there 
might be cases wherein x lacks F and y has it, yet whilst x is the kind of thing that 
can be F, it is not the kind of thing that can be F in virtue of being G—even if it is 
the kind of thing that can be F in virtue of being H, or J, etc. Again, this means 
that fundamental kinds can determine not only which non-basic properties a thing 
can have, and hence which non-basic properties a thing can have in virtue of which 
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base properties, but also which base properties are able to make instances of the rel-
evant kind have certain non-basic properties.41   
 
  Thinking Parts 
 
I have argued that the notion of kind-dependent grounding can do useful meta-
physical work within the context of a view that allows for non-basic differences be-
tween coincident entities (§). In this section, I show that this notion can also do 
valuable work even if we don’t countenance coincident things. My strategy will be 
to consider a problem that arises even if we don’t allow for coinciding objects,  
before explaining how appealing to kind-dependent grounding can solve it. 
 The problem is known as the ‘thinking parts problem’.42 The trouble is that 
whilst it seems like I’m the only conscious being in my vicinity, there’s an argument 
that I—like all other human persons—contain a ‘mighty host’ of conscious beings 
within my borders. Yet clearly this is absurd. As Merricks (, p. ) writes: 
‘[t]here is not a mighty host of conscious, reflective, pain- and pleasure-feeling  
objects now sitting in my chair, now wearing my shirt, now thinking about this  
paper’. 
                                                   
 41 This response might require us to modify Weak Formality even further. For instead of replac-
ing it with Kind-Dependent Formality, we might now need to replace it with (letting ‘KG’ stands for 
the predicate ‘is the kind of thing such that, if it is G, then it is F in virtue of being G’): 
 
 Kind-Dependent Formality*   
  (x) (Gx < Fx) → (y) (Gy & (KF y & KGy)→ (Gy < Fy)) 
 I propose, however, not to dwell on this further modification in what follows. 
 42 There are several discussions of this problem in the literature, which differ from one another 
in various ways. See e.g. Burke (, ), Dorr (), Hawley (), Kovacs (), Merricks 
(; , Ch. ), Noonan (), Olson (), Robinson () and Sider (). See also 
Blatti (), Madden () and Olson (, Ch. ) who discuss the issue within the context of 
the personal identity debate. 
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 The problem turns on two plausible ideas. The first of these is that at least some 
of our conscious properties are intrinsic. (In general, a property is intrinsic just in 
case the things that have it do so solely in virtue of how they are in themselves, and 
not in virtue of how they are related to other (disjoint) things. But this no analysis 
of intrinsicality.) Many arguments for this premise may be given—here I’ll just note 
two considerations.  
 First, it seems intuitive to think that there could be a ‘lonely’ object that is con-
scious (cf. Merricks: , ). That is, it seems that something could be con-
scious despite being the only object that exists. This suggests that at least some con-
scious properties are intrinsic properties. For if a lonely being can be conscious, 
then there are at least some conscious properties that a lonely being can have. These 
properties would then appear to be intrinsic. (In general, if a property passes the 
‘isolation test’—i.e., if it’s instantiable by a lonely object—this is a strong indicator 
that it’s intrinsic.) 
 Second, there is the intuition that an intrinsic duplicate of one of us would have 
to be conscious. Consider for example ‘swampman’, an intrinsic duplicate of one of 
us ‘forged by fortuitous happenings in a swamp’ (cf. Hawthorne: , n. ). 
Many of us share the intuition that swampman would have to be conscious, due to 
being an intrinsic duplicate of a conscious being (one of us). This again suggests 
that there are at least some intrinsic conscious properties. For it tells us that at least 
some such properties are necessarily shared by intrinsic duplicates, and all theories 
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of intrinsicality should admit that being necessarily shared by duplicates is at least a 
good indicator of intrinsicality.43 
 The second core premise concerns the grounds of our intrinsic conscious proper-
ties. The core claim is that if a material thing has some conscious property F, then 
there is some intrinsic microphysical property M, such that the object has F in virtue 
having M. This second premise flows from three ideas. The first is the idea that con-
sciousness is a non-basic property of persons—i.e. a grounded property that is  
always had in virtue of some other more basic property. The second is the idea,  
already encountered in (§), that the non-basic properties of material objects are 
grounded in their microphysical properties (Microphysicalism). The third idea is 
that in general, intrinsic properties have intrinsic grounds. Given the first two 
claims, it follows that when a person has a conscious property, she has this property 
in virtue of having some more basic microphysical property. The third idea then 
ensures that the microphysical properties that ground our intrinsic conscious prop-
erties are themselves intrinsic.  
 Now consider some arbitrary human person, P. And let ‘P-minus’ denote that 
large proper part of P that consists of all of P minus his left foot. (N.b. clearly P and  
P-minus are distinct, for no object is identical to one of its proper parts. And things 
that are distinct are necessarily so.) Lastly, consider some other human person, Q, 
which has all of the same intrinsic microphysical properties as P.44 
                                                   
 43 On some theories, being necessarily shared by intrinsic duplicates is sufficient for (and even 
definitive of) intrinsicality. However, we need not presuppose any of these claims here. 
 44 For present purposes, we can think of the intrinsic microphysical properties of an object as 
being a function of its individual intrinsic properties of, and the spatiotemporal and causal relations 
obtaining between, its microphysical parts (cf. Merricks: ). Given this conception of an intrinsic 
microphysical property, there is no barrier to supposing that two persons (or a person and a large 
proper part thereof) might be intrinsic microphysical duplicates. 
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 We now suppose that Q loses his left foot and survives.45 This means that Q is 
no longer an intrinsic microphysical duplicate of P, but rather an intrinsic micro-
physical duplicate of P-minus. Consequently, Q and P-minus now share all their 
intrinsic microphysical properties. 
 Now from the first premise set out above—that at least some of our conscious 
properties are intrinsic—we can suppose that Q instantiates (after the loss of his left 
foot) some intrinsic conscious property C. Then, given the second core premise, 
which tells us that intrinsic conscious properties always have intrinsic microphysical 
grounds, we can then infer that Q has C in virtue of having some intrinsic micro-
physical property M. So we get: 
 
 () Q has intrinsic conscious property C in virtue of having intrinsic micro- 
  physical property M. 
 
This then implies: 
  
 () Q has intrinsic microphysical property M. 
 
But Q and P-minus share intrinsic microphysical properties. Therefore, from (), 
we get: 
 
 () P-minus has intrinsic microphysical property M. 
 
                                                   
 45 There is a delicate question as to what happens here. For my preferred answer see Author-a 
(XXXX). 
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But by Weak Formality, we can infer from () that: 
 
 () If any object whatsoever has intrinsic microphysical property M, then it  
  has conscious property C in virtue of having M.  
 
From () and () we then infer: 
 
 () P-minus has conscious property C in virtue of having intrinsic microphys- 
  ical property M. 
 
And this entails: 
 
 () P-minus has conscious property C. 
 
And this implies: 
 
 () P-minus is conscious.46 
 
At this point, we have proven that the human person, P, contains a conscious prop-
er part, namely, P-minus. But the reasoning here could easily be extended to prove, 
not only that P-minus contains a whole multitude of such conscious parts, but also 
                                                   
 46 I assume here that having at least one conscious property is sufficient for being conscious. 
Given that conscious properties are determinates of the determinable consciousness, this claim follows 
from the more general idea that having a determinate of some determinable is sufficient for having 
the determinable itself.  
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that the same is true for every one of us. It is in this way that we end up with the 
absurd result that each one of us contains manifold conscious beings.47  
 There are various ways in which one might respond to this problem. One could 
contest the (implicit) idea that human persons are complex material beings—and 
hence the kind of thing that can have intrinsic microphysical properties.48 Or one 
could deny that there are any intrinsic conscious properties, holding instead that all 
such properties are extrinsic (Burke: , Hawley: , Sider: ). One could 
also hold that whilst there are some intrinsic conscious properties, such properties 
are not grounded in more basic microphysical properties (Merricks: , ). 
Finally, one could dispute the idea that there are such entities as P-minus in the first 
place (Olson: , cf. Olson: , Ch. ). That is, one could contest the claim 
that we human persons have large undetached proper parts. 
 It seems to me that each of these options is rather radical. It is certainly radical 
to hold, in line with either the first or the last option, that we aren’t complex mate-
rial things, and/or that we do not have large undetached proper parts. The more 
plausible view is surely that we are complex material things, with various large 
proper parts, including heads and an upper-halves, etc. It also looks quite radical to 
hold either that there are no intrinsic conscious properties, or that such properties 
are not microphysically grounded. We are therefore left with but one option: reject 
Weak Formality and thereby block the inference from () and () to (). 
                                                   
 47 This conclusion is absurd in and of itself. But it also gives rise to various troubling ethical 
problems and absurdities. See Johnston () and Unger (, ). 
 48 Compare here Unger (, ) and Zimmerman (), who, in connection with two 
other problems which seem to over-generate conscious beings, advocate adopting an immaterialist 
view on which we human persons are immaterial entities. (Compare also Robinson: , who rec-
ommends that we deny that we are material beings, and hold instead that we are events constituted 
by the activities of such beings, in order to handle the thinking parts problem. Kovacs:  offers 
an interesting discussion and critique of this idea.) 
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 This is the answer to the thinking parts problem I recommend.49 On this view, 
there is a difference in fundamental kind between we persons and our large proper 
parts, such that whilst we human persons are the kind of object that can be con-
scious and have mental properties, the same is not true of our (large) proper parts.50 
Given this view, it follows that all conscious properties are “kind-dependent proper-
ties”, which can be had only by things of certain kinds. We can then claim that 
when the person, Q, has conscious property C, she has this property in virtue of 
intrinsic microphysical property M only given that she is the sort of  object able to 
instantiate conscious properties. If this is right, then it follows that () is more per-
spicuously written as: 
 
 (*) Q has intrinsic conscious property C in virtue of having intrinsic micro- 
   physical property M, whereby this grounding relation holds only given  
   that Q is the kind of thing that it is. 
 
Moreover, claim () will have to be rejected, in favour of: 
 
 (*) If any object whatsoever has intrinsic microphysical property M, then if  
   that object is the kind of thing that can be conscious, it has conscious  
   property C in virtue of having microphysical property M.  
 
                                                   
 49 I have developed this answer to the thinking parts problem in more detail elsewhere. See  
Author-b (XXXX). 
 50 This view presupposes no particular view about what kind of thing we human persons most 
fundamentally are. It states only that whatever kind of thing we are, things of that kind are able to be 
conscious (at least in propitious circumstances), whilst the same is not true of our large proper parts. 
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Just as before, accepting (*) in place of () implies that we should abandon Weak 
Formality, and replace it with Kind-Dependent Formality (cf. § above).  
 The crucial point here is that if (*) is true instead of (), then we can no longer 
obtain (), () and (), and hence, we can avoid the conclusion that each of us con-
tains a mighty host of conscious proper parts. Moreover, we do not have to make 
any of the radical moves noted above that other authors have made. 
 Thus, on the proposed view, our intrinsic conscious properties are grounded by 
intrinsic microphysical properties. Moreover, there are large proper parts of human 
persons that share these intrinsic microphysical properties. However, these large 
proper parts do not instantiate intrinsic conscious properties, despite instantiating 
their (conditional) microphysical grounds. This is because such properties can only 
be instantiated by things of a certain kind. Since the large proper parts of human 
persons are not the kind of thing that can be conscious—a claim that seems to be 
intuitive enough—it follows that the large proper parts of human persons do not 
have any conscious properties, despite some of them having all the necessary micro-
physical properties.51  
 Rejecting Weak Formality, therefore, and replacing it with Kind-Dependent 
Formality provides us with an attractive way to handle the thinking parts problem. 
                                                   
 51 One might wonder whether this view is really consistent with taking some of our conscious 
properties to be intrinsic. After all, this view seems to imply that Lewisian duplicates (things that 
have precisely the same perfectly natural properties and relations) can differ in terms of these proper-
ties (we can imagine a person and a proper part of some person that are Lewisian duplicates), yet one 
could reasonably take this to show that none of these properties is intrinsic. I have tackled this objec-
tion elsewhere, and so I won’t address it here (see Author-c: XXXX). Suffice it to say that so far as I 
can see, the present proposal does not in any way impugn the claim that at least some of our con-
scious properties are intrinsic. (Note for instance that on the present view, the allegedly intrinsic 
conscious properties only ever have intrinsic grounds. This is arguably sufficient to show that such 
properties are intrinsic. Note also that whilst my proposal makes the instantiation of intrinsic con-
scious properties in some sense dependent on an object’s fundamental kind, this does not threaten 
the status of those properties as intrinsic. Things would be otherwise if fundamental kinds were ex-
trinsic. However, fundamental kinds are intuitively intrinsic to their instances.)  
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For if the former principle is replaced by the latter, then, given the intuitive claim 
that whilst persons are the kind of thing that can be conscious, the same is not true 
of their (large) proper parts, it follows that even though persons and the large proper 
parts thereof can have the same intrinsic microphysical properties, it is only ever the 
persons, never their parts, that are conscious in virtue of having such properties. 
Therefore, since the thinking parts problem arises even for those who don’t believe 
in coincident things, there may be reason for everyone—not just those who accept 
coincident objects—to hold that Weak Formality fails, and that the closest thing 
that holds instead is Kind-Dependent Formality. 
 It might be noted, moreover, that this reply to the thinking parts problem can 
be extended to handle a wholerange of related problems, which arise whenever two 
or more material objects (that differ in kind) fail to share some non-basic intrinsic 
property whilst being intrinsic microphysical duplicates. For whenever such cases 
arise, e.g. when intrinsic duplicates x and y are such that x has intrinsic property F 
and y lacks it, we can say that whilst the objects share their microphysical proper-
ties, these properties can do their grounding work only in the case of x and not in 
the case of y, for it is only x that is the kind of thing that can instantiate the relevant 
non-basic intrinsic property in question.52  
 The solution to the thinking parts problem developed here, therefore, suggests a 
more general style of a reply to a broader range of problems. These share a common 
structure: they arise whenever two material objects (that differ in kind) are intrinsic 
microphysical duplicates and yet differ regarding some non-basic intrinsic property. 
                                                   
 52 Think for example of the statue and an intrinsic microphysical duplicate of it which is a mere 
proper part of some larger block of marble. Intuitively, only the statue is intrinsically beautiful. I 
suggest we can account for this, despite the fact that it has the same intrinsic microphysical proper-
ties as the embedded hunk of marble, and whilst preserving Microphysicalism, by saying that only 
the statue is the kind of thing that can be intrinsically beautiful. 
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  Conclusion  
 
The thesis of Weak Formality tells us that if one thing a is F in virtue of  
being G, then any possible object that is G is F in virtue of being G. What I have 
argued here is that despite its intuitive appeal, one can plausibly reject this princi-
ple, by appealing to cases of kind-dependent grounding. Specifically, I have argued 
that there is theoretical utility in treating certain cases as being cases of kind-
dependent grounding, whereby these cases show that Weak Formality fails. 53  
 To do this, I have focused on two metaphysical problems. The first arises if we 
grant (as many philosophers do) that coincident objects (of different kinds) can 
differ in terms of their non-basic properties. The problem is that since the properties 
are non-basic, it is hard to see how the coincident entities could fail to share them, 
without ending up facing contradiction. The second problem arises even without 
the assumption that entities can coincide. Here the trouble is that it can apparently 
be shown that each of us contains manifold conscious parts. Yet evidently this is not 
so. 
 What I have tried to show is that both problems can be given elegant solutions 
if we appeal to the notion of kind-dependent grounding, and thence reject the prin-
ciple of Weak Formality. I submit that this gives us good reason to reject this prin-
ciple, and to believe that there are genuine cases of kind-dependent grounding. 
 In short, we began by asking whether it is so that if one thing, a, is F in virtue of 
being G, does it follow that everything that is G must be F for that reason? The an-
                                                   
 53 I also argued, in (§.), that Weak Formality might fail because whilst two coincident objects 
x and y are G, and whilst x and y are both the kind of thing that can be F, the reason x is F (in virtue 
of being G) and y is not is that only x is the kind of thing for which Gness is an Fness-grounding 
property. Cf. here fn. . 
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swer is that there appears to be good reason not to accept this. For it appears that 
maintaining otherwise, by holding that there can be cases of kind-dependent 
grounding, has theoretical utility, insofar as it enables us to solve a range of meta-
physical problems. (It may even be serviceable for solving problems I have yet to 
consider. I would encourage the reader to explore whether or not this is the case.) 
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